

## **SELF-INTEREST AND THE INSTITUTIONALISATION OF CORRUPTION IN NIGERIA: IMPLICATIONS FOR NATION BUILDING**

**Bala Salisu**

Department of Business Administration and Management  
The Federal Polytechnic Damaturu

### **ABSTRACT**

The main value system of the Nigerian elite—powerful and responsible for all the socio-economic and political decisions that shape the fortunes of Nigeria—is that of the free market system, a system whose driving motive is individual self-interest. This paper argues that it is the perversion of this ethos and its transformation into egoism that is responsible for the widespread corruption now brazenly manifest in all horizons of Nigeria's national life. For all practical purposes, corruption has now been institutionalised in the Nigerian body politic. This paper discusses the mechanism of isomorphism by which this institutionalisation has taken place, and sketches the role of the principal actors (based on the principal-agent-client model) in this deleterious process. The implications of corruption on the process of nation building are pointed out, and a number of fundamental issues discussed as the paper's contribution to curbing corruption and building a stable state in Nigeria.

### **INTRODUCTION**

**S**hrinking frontiers of government and expanding role of the organised private sector in economic management is the dual most visible thrust discernible in the economic policies of government in Nigeria today (Hoff, 2006:84), especially since the ascendance of civilian administration in May 1999. This strategic policy shift is best described as emergent, characterized, as it were, by a gradual renunciation of the mixed economy philosophy, where most of the core economic decisions are made by the duo of politics and bureaucracy, and the coeval adoption of the free-market ethos, where large corporations and powerful/wealthy individuals play

increasingly dominant decisional roles in the management of the Nigerian economy. Thus, Nigeria may be termed a transitional economy moving away from a hybrid economic system to a more truly market-driven one, one in which the freely operating self-interest of its principal economic actors assures the efficient allocation of national resources in the satisfaction of public need (Baradat, 1978). This, theoretically at least, is the universal template on which all relevant public policies are supposedly crafted (Balewa, 1994). If this were so, in practice, Nigeria would have been by now a prosperous developing economy in the league of the Asian Tigers.

Pathetically however, we all know (eclectically or empirically) that it will take a long while and prolonged selfless hard-work for Nigeria to come even close to any one of the Asian Tigers, say Malaysia, as we are currently far removed from the stage of economic development the Asian Tigers now occupy. What with the spectre of poverty and deprivations confidently visible in all horizons of our national life! What with the greatest portion of Nigerians (over 70% of the populace, FGN, 2000) still mastered by the basic necessities of life!—food, shelter, clothing and minimal education. Ironically, this condition of abject poverty, fit only for the primordial ages, is Nigeria's painful reality when appreciated against the backcloth of the abundant natural and human resources God has eminently blessed the country with. What then is amiss?

We posit that the impoverished condition most Nigerians today wallow in is part of the retributive outcome of the behavioural propensity of both leaders and followers, a propensity that consistently sacrifices personal integrity and requirements of natural justice in the pursuit of criminal self-enrichment and self-aggrandisement (Tijjani, 1989). Surely, God never attenuates the bounties which he bestows on a people until the people corrupt themselves (Qur'an, 8:53; 13:11). We have certainly carved for ourselves, to our shame, a deleterious niche among the comity of corrupt nations. The problem is not even the stupendous scale of today's

corruption, but the inkling of what corruption will become tomorrow. It is frightening for anyone with foresight enough to see that Nigerians have changed themselves into the unenviable station of a nation of "consumers of illicit gains." Nigeria has reached the unenviable stage where corruption and the evils it begets seem to be self-perpetuating, for virtually all of us are in one way or another enmeshed in its suffocating web, as perpetrators, collusive actors or morally unacceptable silent abettors. Corruption has been successfully institutionalized.

Thus, Nigeria's debilitating economic woes stem directly from greed and inordinate larceny, continually fuelled, as it were, by the aggravation of divergence of interests among social and economic actors in the country, with each of the interest groups madly after their own share of the national cake, even if they have done nothing in producing the cake. The problem with Nigeria is therefore not an economic one, but one of bad behaviour borne out of corrupt mindset (Gurin, n.d.; Akinola, n.d.). Accordingly, it was averred (Salisu, 2002; Sanusi, 2005) that what Nigeria needs is not an economic reform model but a behavioural reform programme targeted at Nigerians as a panacea to the menace of corruption in Nigeria's public life. This behavioural reengineering is all the more strident now that the call for nation building, couched in divisive diction, is ringing plaintively around the country. History has shown that no state institution

stands the ravages of corruption, and no ennobling feeling of mutual destiny will ever beat in the heart of a people whose very life has been thoroughly emasculated by corruption (Ayei, 1990; Balewa, 1994; Adamolekun, 2005).

In view of the foregoing, this paper provides a conceptual framework for understanding corruption, and further sketches a generic characterisation of people who are susceptible to becoming corrupt using the principal-agent-client model. On the basis of this framework, the paper identifies some types of corrupt practices usually engaged in by the trio of a corrupt principal, his/her colluding or coaxed agent, and the hapless or complicit client. Then the analytical construct of isomorphism is used in understanding the osmosis of corruption among the trio operating in transactional context. This understanding finally provided the basis for the suggestions made towards tackling corruption and shouldering the burden of nation building.

### **THE PHENOMENON OF CORRUPTION**

Corruption occurs in the public life of a nation whenever one of the fourteen principles of management Fayol (1949) advocated is abused. The principle, as epigrammatised in Smith and Boyns (2005:1322), requires from all people in positions of trust and fiduciary relationships to “subordinate their individual interests to general interests.” Accordingly, corruption has been defined as “the deliberate intent

of subordinating common interest to personal interest” (Napal, 2006:5). Thus, corruption is the inverse interpretation of Fayol’s principle.

There is a bewildering array of definitions of the term corruption other than the managerial one given above. This is due to the multiplicity of perspectives from which the issue has been approached by scholars and investigators. However, following Johnston (1996), this paper sees two strands of thought on the issue. The first strand (Nye, 1967; Goldsmith, 1999; Aminu, 2002; Xin and Rudel, 2004; TI, 2009a; Connelly and Ones, 2008) focuses on the behavioural aspects of corruption and holds the opinion that corruption is the abuse of public office, power or authority for private gain. The second strand of thought defines corruption on the basis of the interactions that took place among the actors involved: a principal, an agent, a client (Alam, 1989; Lambsdorff, 2001; Okogbule, 2007), thereby placing emphasis on the transactional aspects of the phenomenon.

All the two strands of thought mentioned above are relevant to the understanding of corruption in the Nigerian context. And since the issue is to be discussed within the broad scope of nation-building, we further assert that corruption transcends the “public” domain and is inextricably intertwined with the private one.

Accordingly, this paper, following Chinhamo and Shumba (2007), defines corruption as the abuse or complicity

in the abuse of private or public power by private employees, public officials, independent agents or other relationships of that kind that unlawfully or wrongfully confer on themselves or others some benefit. This abuse or complicity in abuse of power include but is not limited to embezzlement, nepotism, bribery, extortion, influence peddling, fraud or speed money (Chetwynd, Chetwynd and Spector, 2003).

Embezzlement is the “theft of resources” by people who are entrusted with its administration (Andvig, Fjeldstad, Amundsen, Siessener and Soreide, 2000:15). Nepotism takes the form of the “appointment of relatives, friends, or political associates to public offices regardless of their merits and the consequences on the public weal (Alatas, 1999:6). Bribery is the act of giving and accepting gifts, traditional titles, or favours offered, the objective being to induce the bribe receiver to give special consideration to the interest of the bribe payer (Batabyal and Beladi, 2008); it include bribery of high-ranking politicians or political parties, bribery of low-level public officials to “speed things up”, and the use of personal or familiar relationships to win public contracts (TI, 2008:7). Extortion is money and other resources extracted by the use of coercion, violence, or the threats to use force (Beare, 2007), and is usually associated with criminal gangs and other miscreants (Sesay, Ukeje, Aina and Odebiyi, 2003; Eweje, 2006; Nolte, 2007; Ewhrudjakpor, 2008).

Fraud is an economic crime and involves intentional criminal deception, trickery and swindle for private benefit (Rossouw, 1998). It includes white-collar

crime, corporate fraud, securities fraud, capital market fraud and accounting fraud (Sliter, 2007:13). Other types of corruption include illegal campaign contributions, laundering of funds, consumer frauds, environmental pollution, price fixing, tax evasion and avoidance, computer break-ins and cyber crimes, rigging public bidding for procurement and other contract types, collusive auditing, selling official information etc (Adeloye, 2000; Shen and Williamson, 2005; Uniamikogbo, 2006; Manzetti and Wilson, 2007; Boehm, 2007; Darken, 2008).

From the foregoing, one can easily appreciate the fact that it is beyond the scope of this paper to catalogue even the major types of corrupt practices that occur in Nigeria, much less their continually mutating variants (See Bawa and Garba, 2004, for a legal list). Suffice it to say that corruptions differ in their magnitude and impact. There is bureaucratic/petty corruption and political/grand corruption (Ekeanyanwu, Loremikan and Ikubaje, 2004); coercive or collusive corruption (Mele and Bello, 2007; Khalil and Lawaree, 1995); corruption that is cost-reducing or benefit-enhancing (Mbaku, 2007); briber-initiated or bribe-initiated corruption (TI, 2009); primary or secondary corruption (Werlin, 2000); predictable or arbitrary corruption; corruption involving cash payments or not (Lennerfors, 2009); private-to-

private and private-to-public corruption (Hess, 2009); etc. The pertinent question here is: Who are the doers of these multifarious types of corruption?

**AGENTS OF CORRUPTION:  
WHO ARE THEY?**

The agents of corruption are found in every strata of the Nigerian society, from the executive arm of government (Nanda, 2006) and their public servants (Kingshott and Dincer, 2008), to the legislature (Aiyede, 2009) and the judiciary (Also, 2005). They are found in the armed forces (Ojo, 2006), education sector (TI, 2006b), the media world (Ojo, 2003), and the religious realm (Treisman, 2000). The corruptors are legion. The table on the second column of this page is TI's 2008 ranking of Nigerian institutions by their degree of involvement in corruption. (Note: 1=not at all corrupt, 5=extremely corrupt).

Any analysis within the ambience of a paper such as this on the individual class of corruptors will at best be platitudinous in generalisation or tediously voluminous. However, Lambsdorff (2001) and Boehm (2007) have given us a transactional framework for understanding the types of corruptors in societal institutions, using the principal-agent-client model. The framework yields four types of corruptors: namely, the principals, the agents, the clients and the regulated firms. The following figure attempts a diagrammatic surmise of the


interactions among the possible corruptors and the wide variety of corrupt opportunities that exist within the principal-agent-client model.

The application of the principal-agent-model in the study of corruption was attributed to Rose-Ackerman (1978). The model suggests that economic actions are restricted by legislation and regulation, but that corruption can enlarge the set of possible actions to be taken by the parties when they so wished to be corrupt.

**Distribution of Nigerian Institutions By  
How They Are Perceived To Be  
Affected By Corruption**

| Institutions                 | Scores |
|------------------------------|--------|
| Police                       | 4.7    |
| Political Parties            | 4.6    |
| Customs                      | 4.3    |
| Parliament/Legislature       | 4.0    |
| Registry and Permit Services | 3.9    |
| Utilities                    | 3.7    |
| Tax Revenue Authorities      | 3.7    |
| Education System             | 3.6    |
| The Military                 | 3.3    |
| Business/Private Sector      | 3.2    |
| Judiciary                    | 3.2    |
| Media                        | 3.0    |
| NGOs                         | 2.5    |
| Medical Services             | 2.5    |
| Religious Bodies             | 2.2    |

Source: Transparency International, *Bribe Payers Index*, 2008.



Source: Bolhm, 2007.

### 1. The Principals:

These are the law-makers, those who set the rules that regulate the exchange relationship between and among all members of the society, including the agents (executive arm of government), the regulated firms (organized private sector) and clients (citizens and consumers). The principal has a dual opportunity to engage in corrupt act: change the rules of the game to favour selected actors in the economy or interfere directly in the affairs of regulatory institutions, by the constitutional oversight functions he enjoys. In Nigeria, most principals concentrate on what serves their parochial self-interests only: by TI's Index, they are part of the most corrupt institutions in Nigeria, with

scores of 4.6 and 4.0 out of 5.0, for political parties and the legislature respectively (TI, 2008:20). The reward for such behaviours are enormous (power, money, perks, etc) this behaviour is further emboldened by the presence of poor control mechanisms (constitutional checks and balances), and ineffectual sanctions (such as recalls) that characterised the political structure in Nigeria. The principals are grand corruptors, and the impact of their corrupt practices often outlasts their public service periods (Ekeanyanwu, Lorenikan & Ikubaje, 2007).

### 2. The Agents:



behavioural motives of the corrupt and corrupting economic actors. As mentioned earlier in the introductory section of the paper, the explanation for the self-seeking tendencies of the economic actors lies in the professed ethos that guide the resolution of the basic economic problem of who gets what, how much of it and when. This brings us to a discussion on the value system of the corruptors.

### **SELF-INTEREST:**

#### **THE ETHOS OF CORRUPTION**

Ethos refer to the shared fundamental and distinctive character of a group, social context or period of time, typically expressed in attitudes, habits and belief (Microsoft Encarta, 2009). The ethos of individualism, otherwise known as self-interest in classical economic theory, is decidedly the guiding philosophy shaping the behaviour of most Nigerians today. For the few elite, it is only ethos and no other (Balewa, 1994; Tijjani, 1989).

The ethos of self-interest is commonly assumed to enhance prosperity, because like an invisible hand, it causes individuals competing among themselves, to produce what the society values for its development (Lambsdorff, 2001). (This is called the market economy). But this type of invisible hand is nowhere to be found in Nigeria where the vast majority of economic actors are corrupt through and through. Aluko (2005:109) has put it more tartly: "The fact is that Nigeria does not have, and never had, a market economy. Nigeria has a black market economy, a savage bazaar

economy, as its real market." In other words, Nigeria never had benefited from the beneficial guidance of the invisible hand. On the contrary, the Nigerian economy has all along been dribbled by the "invisible foot" (Brock & Magee, 1989) of the faceless elite. This *invisible foot*, defined as the propensity to seek the satisfaction of one's personal interest over and above the common wheel (Salisu, 2002), *ab anitio* marked out Nigeria for a decent into a cesspool of corruption. "Not only does the system continue to concentrate the nation's wealth in the hands of the same elite, it also concedes to that elite the right to the wealth of the nation and the economic and political powers that go with that right" (Aluko, 2005:110). In the process, national wealth (both human and material), is corruptly diverted to private use, and nothing is left for any meaningful development initiatives. This predatory version of market economy is further supported by the country's distributional fiscal federalism, which only helps accentuate the unrelenting rivalry (not competition) among the country's warring ethnic elite (Momodu, 2002). The net result is that almost all institutions of state atrophied. Nothing gets accomplished through them. Those who need their services, even as they must for lack of alternative choices, have to resort to all manner of ingenuous sharp practices and "who-you-know" syndrome (Dozie and Bickersteth, 1993). Thus, the corrupt ethos of self-interest has forced most Nigerians to



fall back on traditional personal relationships and bribery and corruption and other forms of persuasions such as extortion and fraud to get their needs satisfied, thereby further entrenching corruption in the polity.

An explanation for widespread incidence of self-interest found among all strata of the Nigerian society can be found in the normative ethics literature, especially the one dealing with egoism (Napal, 2005). Egoism “defines right or acceptable behaviour in terms of the consequences for the individual” (Ferrell and Fraedrich, 1997:54). To the egoist, all is fair and available for the taking. An egoist therefore seldom makes decisions that do not maximise his own self-interests. In an economy of restricted choices such as Nigeria’s, the behaviour of the egoistic Nigerian is largely intrinsically unethical, always focusing on short-term goals, striving to make the most of any opportunity that comes his/her way, as long as he/she derives a benefit from it (Napal, 2006). The opportunity offered in the principal-agent-client model are one of enlarging the exchange relationships beyond what is legally allowed into the domain of self-interest, of which the egoist invariably finds it difficult not to traverse. Corruption naturally results.

## **INSTITUTIONALISATION OF CORRUPTION**

The elite are the agents of institutionalising corruption in Nigeria, as Tijjani wailed, and Okogbule

provided recent illustrations, as follows:

The politically very assertive and generally self-seeking elite ... have transformed the state into their private estate and have spread their ethos of self-aggrandisement to affect every public office and every public officer (Tijjani, 1989).

... the military administrations of Generals Ibrahim Babangida and Sani Abacha regarded corruption as a positive virtue and almost made it an official policy (Okogbule, 2007).

Nigeria has been an unfortunate nation in terms of the elite that arose to lead it from independence to date. Perhaps with the exception of the first republic and the military junta of General Murtala Ramat Mohammed, most of the administrations that governed Nigeria were paragons of corruption. By mid 1980’s, corruption has been singled out as the strategic causative agent of the country’s economic crisis (Ahmed 11, 1993). By then, the dominance of private motive in public decisions was assured and institutionalised. Thereafter, people look on behaviour based on any other premise virtually inconceivable or at best un-Nigerian. How does this come to pass?

Isomorphism has been advanced as the mechanism through which various types of behaviours, including corruption are spread in a social context (Venard, 2009). DiMaggio and Powell (1983) had defined isomorphism as a “constraining process that forces one unit in a

population to resemble other units that face the same set of environmental conditions.” Through their rapacious economic policies, the elite have succeeded in constraining the economic space, reducing the vast population to a condition of poverty and forced and restricted choice (Ewhrudjakpor, 2008). Thus thoroughly emasculated, both individuals and institutions (private and public) begin to act and behave like survivors of a great disaster, dazed and rudderless. And before long, everyone begins to copy the stronger corruptors. For individuals, this was achieved through coercive isomorphism where individuals are homogenized in attitude by state power—handing out rewards for conformance and punishment for rebellion (Scott, 1995). The rules of corporate citizenship and societal expectations re thus changed, and people come to learn the most appropriate manners to behave (Hofstede, Neuijen, Ohayv and Sanders, 1990), which in the Nigerian case means to engage in deceit, cheating and trickery in order merely to survive.

As for organisations, their subjugation was brought about through the process of mimetic isomorphism. Mimeticism is the process whereby organisations copy the ways of their most successful peers even if the ways thus copied are corrupt ways (Venard and Hanafi, 2008). For example, rules will be raised making it easy for pliant institutions to receive favours and hard for those who entertain staying honest. In time,

almost all organisations conform in order to survive.

Finally, the society got swept away in the gale wind of corruption through normative isomorphism, whereby societal norms and values were changed through state intervention in the form of politicisation of appointment procedures into key public offices, and of economic activities perfected under the garb of correcting market failures in the economy (Shleifer and Vishny, 1998; Acemoglu and Verdier, 2000). Laws and regulations were introduced for the sole purpose of wealth acquisition and power mongering. Overall, the whole market system and bureaucracy be-comes deeply compromised by corrupt practices (Sowunmi, Adesola and Salako, 2009).

The ultimate result of the foregoing triple-pronged attack on public morality is the effective institutionalisation of corruption in Nigeria. Corrupt self-interest has now become so common a motive for doing things, public and private, that one finds little or no variations within and among the diverse ethnic nationalities and social classes in the country. Any attempt at policy reversal by any well-meaning person or administration is sooner than later bound to come up against the stiffest of resistance from vested interests. A case to buttress this point is the ordeal of Nuhu Ribadu, Nigeria’s former anti-corruption Caesar at the Economic and Financial Crimes Com-mission (EFCC). His record of meritorious service, internationally acclaim-ed, under the Olusegun

Obasanjo administration was placed round his neck as an albatross by the incumbent Shehu Musa Yar'Adua government. The reason is simple: those he prosecuted under the former regime are now the ones calling the shots in the present regime, and they un-ashamedly went for his jugular. He has since joined his kindred exiled spirits abroad (Ribadu, 2009).

The implications of this institutionalisation of corruption on nation building will be discussed in the next section of the paper.

#### **IMPLICATIONS OF CORRUPTION ON NATION BUILDING**

The destruction of state institutions through the institution of corruption has far reaching consequences too numerous to mention. On the aggregate, corruption impedes economic growth, exacerbates income inequality and increases the vulnerability of the poor while attenuating their trust in government programmes; constrict political space and undermine democracy, dampens investment, harm international trade and reduce the subjective wellbeing of the people (Tavits, 2008; Desta, 2006; Mishler and Rose, 2009). It has also fuelled war and intensifies the fight for the control of carbon resources in the country (Ile Billon, 2003; Bhattacharyya, 2007; Spalding, 2000). Clearly, a nation facing these and other no less debilitating challenges is a nation that has fallen apart. To such a nation, the imperatives of nation-building cannot be over-emphasized (Kumar, 2005).

Nation building refers to the process of constructing or structuring a national identity using the power of the state for the purpose of creating unity, harmony, prosperity and political stability in the state. It deals with the issue of unity among the various ethnic groups in Nigeria (Salisu, 2003). Thus, nation building entails "the welding into a modern nation-state of different peoples with relatively different cultures and traditions, religion and languages" (Ayida, 1990).

The issue of nation-building is a weighty one in Nigeria; it has even a local nomenclature—the Nigerian question, or the national question. It represents the conscious yearning of Nigerians to find a peaceful resolution to the myriad of crises facing the country, ranging from political conflicts to ethnic antagonism, religious intolerance, social unrest and cultural incompatibilities. These challenges have put immense strain on the unity of the country, and its prospect of surviving as an indivisible and indissoluble sovereign nation at peace with itself and among the comity of nations became tenuous at best. At various times, a *sovereign national conference* (a euphemism for dismemberment of the country along ethnic fault-lines) has been called for where the structure of the Nigerian nation will be reengineered from the scratch. Though no such gatherings have so far seen the light of day, a number of non-governmental bodies have organised dialogues on the same

issue (e.g. the 1<sup>st</sup> Trust annual Dialogue on "The Nigerian Question: The Way Forward" organised by Media Trust Ltd in January 2004). The government, on its part, was only able to convene "Constitutional Conferences", where the Nigerian Constitution was looked into for amendments.

Notwithstanding these efforts, we are of the opinion that no amount of restructuring will make any meaning to the generality of Nigerians when the polity is awash with corruption and social injustice. It has indeed been a historical refrain that a nation can survive unbelief, but it cannot bear the burden of injustice, especially that midwife as a result of the criminal corruption of the elite.

The creation of a corruption-free polity is actually not an exercise in nation building (even though the ravages of corruption in a country generally trigger in the people the need to feel a sense of belonging to the polity). Fighting and curbing corruption in a state is an exercise in state-building, that is to say, the creation, development and sustenance of viable state institutions such as the executive, the judiciary, the legislative, the media, the academia, political parties, the civil service, the armed forces, etc. The problem is to ensure that these institutions work according to the philosophies and procedures as well as the fundamental objectives and guiding principles girding their creation. Going by historical antecedents, the most important institutions to the development of a viable state structure in Nigeria are the

political institutions, the civil service, the military and the judiciary (Pattel and Wilson, 2004; 2001; Kaur, 2007). These four institutions, if they will be reengineered to work effectively and impartially, actually embody the greatest potential for bridging the deep seated divisions inherent in the Nigerian polity: namely, ethnic and religious divide (Agbu, 2004; Nolte, 2007). These institutions should be built on a single generally subscribed to ideological orientation which will give the citizens a shared sense of common purpose and destiny (Obama, 2006). At present, no such ideology is available; only some constitutional principles like federal character, indigeneship, citizenship and residency rights, which actually legitimises discrimination and open the conduit for exploitation of state resources by a rapacious elite masquerading in the garb of ethnic champions.

This is not to say that ethnicity is an insurmountable impediment to nation building; in fact, the formation of ethnically constituted states is the exception rather than the norm (Chambers, 2003; King, 2001). Nor is the spatial dispersion of the people a problem, especially in today's highly networked communities (Tynes, 2007). What is needed to forge a common front in the task of nation-building is the need to respect one another first as human beings, above all else (Salisu, 2003). This will form the bastion upon which to nurture the political will necessary for collectively designing the structures of the state and of maintaining them. Thus, the following

section of the paper proffers measures towards addressing these and similar problems.

### **THE WAY FORWARD**

When considered against the grim backcloth of discordant tunes sounded in opposition to corruption, and the use to which such opposition was employed in fanning the question of nation building, together with the imperatives that must be addressed in arriving at a workable solution acceptable to all Nigerians, one cannot be too circumspect. Thus, we shall approach the issue of lifting a prostrate nation by addressing a few fundamental issues which, if courageously tackled by the political and economic elite—they just have to take the vanguard in this war for survival by giving us a vision we can all believe in, share and internalize individually—Nigeria will once more stand to realise the chance for greatness it lost in the 1970s (Ayida, 1990). Six issues, I believe, are fundamental to fighting corruption and rejuvenating our state institutions in the process of nation building.

#### **1. Federalism:**

This is a mechanism for constructive management of conflict among heterogeneous ethnic nationalities in a country (Elaigwu, 2005). Federalism can serve two goals in a multi-ethnic society: political accommodation and economic prosperity, and these two goals must be the driving force for nation building. Even though it partly has to do with

the delineation of power between the various structures of the state, this should never be predicated on ethnic enclaves, as the viability of the “ethnic nationalities” championed by some as ‘state’ is nothing but a myth (Walby, 2003); for in this 21<sup>st</sup> century, there are more nationalities (more than 100 in Nigeria alone) than states, and global consensus would never countenance the emergence of ‘states’ doomed to fail *ab initio*. Again, the kind of federalism we require is one that doesn’t begin and end with the allocation of federal appointments and revenue sharing, important as these are, especially with regards to the dictates of fiscal federalism. On the contrary, we envision a federalism built on a value system where all citizens will have unfettered access to all benefits available to all, not just in their places of origin but in wherever they reside. Obama’s (2006) message of a value-based governance system, which he is now experimenting in America, is a practical guide in this regard.

#### **2. National Citizenship:**

Corollary to the indigene-neutral definition of federalism given above is the question of citizenship. The two constitutions of 1979 and 1999 made a travesty of this all-important identity by predicating a person’s citizenship status on the pedestal of ethnic enclaves. This approach simply accentuates our differences without attenuating their divisive properties as evidenced by the heat generated on

calls for sovereign national conferences (Ikejiani-Clark, 2005; Akinyemi, 2005). The concept of indigeneship upon which participative governance is based only serves to emphasize our incidental differences which more often than not are used for discriminatory ends only (Salisu, 2003). To circumvent this, a national citizenship is hereby suggested. This is a concept with two definitional dimensions, one dimension defining who a citizen of Nigeria is according to the relevant provisions of the 1999 Constitution [see: Sections 25(1), 26(1)(2), and 27(1)(2)]. The second dimension addresses the right of the citizen so defined to participate in the political activities anywhere he finds himself resident, whether or not such place is ethnic place of origin.

### **3. The Civil Service:**

In addition to its traditional role as the mechanism through which governance is mediated (Salisu, 2009), the civil service is a melting pot for the best the nation has to offer in service to the people. As such, it is only important that it should not be politicized. It is the politicisation of the civil service that led to the entrenchment of corruption and the attendant deleterious consequences the nation is now reaping (Ejiogu, 2001). Professionalism should be the uncompromising touchstone for the management of the civil service. Meritocracy, not some quota system, should be used unsparingly, in line with the national citizenship concept of free mobility of goods and persons,

free association and full residency rights as the only yardstick for participation in public life. The competition this will unleash will go a long way in curbing corruption in the civil service.

### **4. The Armed Forces:**

The changing definition of nation-building, especially from the perspective of the United States and its allies is the use of the armed forces in the aftermath of a conflict to underpin an enduring transition to democracy (Dobbins, 2003). This definition underscores the importance of the military as an indispensable institution of state. As such, there is no rational ground for the effort made to compartmentalise the civil and military power of the state. They should be complementarily utilized in the process of nation-building, with the military subordinate to civil authorities (Cantwell, 2007). The challenge today is to demilitarize the democratic process (Ojo, 2006), and this cannot be successfully attained unless the military and armed forces are reformed and professionalized.

### **5. Moral Orientation:**

There is a question of morality in virtually all strata of a nation's life, regulating issues of what is right and what is wrong, even if some cannot be legislated (Obama, 2006). It is a nation's moral fibre that gives strength and resilience to its institutions and procedures so that they can absorb all the shocks and challenges that usually accompany any journey of positive

development (Pogge, 2002). The repositories of this moral strength are the people, and their continuing moral education through our national norms and metaphors will serve to make the nation impervious to the ravages of corruption. It is lack of moral strength that usually forces well-meaning persons to do their duties only in ways that confers on them some personal extra-legal perks and perquisites (Iyanda, 2001). The moral guidance of the two dominant religions in Nigeria (Christianity and Islam), common in origin, should be wisely used to fight the cancer of corruption, fraud, bribery, extortion, and deceit. Values are relevant and central to the question of national leadership (Bugaje, 2005).

#### **6. Education:**

Human capital development is an indispensable requirement in nation-building and fighting corruption. Fighting corruption and building a nation necessarily requires functional "education and training programmes based on progressive ... values for officials, civil society actors and citizens..." (Murithi, 2006:10). Education is the only credible means of empowering the people. However, the type of education that should be designed should be the functional type that equips the educant with useable skills required in his society. As it is today, Nigerian educational institutions are characterized by poor quality and unequal access. Furthermore, corruption has defeated the very

purpose of education: having a functional, universal and open system based on merit and not money (TI, 2009b; Agabi, 2005; Tukur, 2005). Emphasis should be placed on technical and vocational education and training.

#### **CONCLUSION**

Nigeria is at a cross-road, at a liminal threshold. As a nation, we have to make conscious, even painful, decisions that will leap-frog the country on the path to recovery and development. This cannot be contemplated in an atmosphere suffused with all kinds of collusive corruption. We have to soberly and conscientiously turn a new leaf and learn to live according to our lawful means. I am certain sermonising is not a panacea: no one will hear! What we need is a product champion (Walcoff, Ouellette and Cheremisinoff, 1983:74,75). We need strong leadership that will serve as champions of the regeneration processes, leaders whose personal examples we see in their own lives, and not over the media. Only then shall corruption depart our shores, or at least go deep down underground. And only then, thereafter, would the dynamic process of nation building found sure footing in the soil of the Nigerian psyche.

#### **REFERENCES**

- Acemoglu, D. and T. Verdier (2000): "The Choice between Market Failures and Corruption." *American Economic Review*, Vol. 1, Pp. 194-211

- Adamolekun, L. (2005): "Governance Context and Reorientation of Government." In: L. Adamolekun (Ed.) *Public Administration in Africa: Main Issues and Selected Country Studies*. Spectrum Books Ltd., Ibadan, Pp. 3-16
- Adeloye, A. (2000): "The Information Market in Nigeria." *Journal of Information Science*, Vol. 26, No. 4, Pp. 282-285
- Agabi, K. G. (2005): "The Nigerian Question: The Way Forward." In: A. K. W. Aniche (Ed.), *Discharging a Burden—Voices from the 1<sup>st</sup> Trust Annual Dialogue—The Nigerian Question: The Way Forward*, Media Trust Ltd.: Lagos, Pp. 50-61
- Agbu, O. (2004): "Ethnic Militias and the Threat to Democracy in Post-Transition Nigeria." Research Paper No. 127, Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, Uppsala
- Ahmed II, H. (1993): "Management and the Challenges of Our Times." *Management in Nigeria*, Vol. 29, No. 3 and 4, July-December
- Aiyede, E. R. (2009): "The Political Economy of Fiscal Federalism and the Dilemma of Constructing a Development State in Nigeria." *International Political Science Review*, Vol. 30, No. 3, Pp. 249-269.
- Akinola, P. J. (n.d): *Greed: Mother of Indiscipline and Corruption*. NOA Occasional Publication, No. 1
- Akinyemi, A. B. (2005): "The Nigerian Question: The Way Forward." In: A. K. W. Aniche (Ed.), *Discharging a Burden—Voices from the 1<sup>st</sup> Trust Annual Dialogue—The Nigerian Question: The Way Forward*, Media Trust Ltd.: Lagos, Pp. 28-33
- Alam, M. S. (1989): "Anatomy of Corruption: An Approach to the Political Economy of Underdevelopment." *American Journal of Economics and Sociology*, Vol. 48, No. 4, Pp. 441-456.
- Alatas, S. H. (1999): *Corruption and the Destiny of Asia*. Simon and Schuster
- Ali, A. Y. (1998): *Modern English Translation of the Holy Qur'an: Meanings and Commentary*. Manar International, Kansas City.
- Also, S. M. (2005): "Abuse of Judicial Process and the Neglect of the Rule of Law: Implications on Nation Building." *Management Network Journal*, Vol. 3, No. 6, June, Pp. 67-73
- Aluko, S. (2005): "Reforming Nigeria: The Economic Dimension." In: K. W. Aniche (Ed.), *Discharging a Burden—Voices from the 2nd Trust Annual Dialogue—Reforming Nigeria: Which Model?* Media Trust Ltd: Nigeria, Pp. 103-137.
- Aminu, A. A. (2002): "Political Corruption in Nigeria." *Management Network Journal*, Vol. 1, No. 1, Pp 39-47
- Andvig, J. C., O. Fjeldstad, I. Amundsen, T. Siessener and T. Soreide (2000): *Research on Corruption: A Policy Oriented Survey*. Final Report of a Corruption Survey Commissioned by NORAD, December



- Ayeni, V. (1990): "Managing Nigeria's Civil Service in the 1990's." *Nigerian Forum*, Vol. 10, Nos. 9 and 10, September/October.
- Ayida, A. A. (1990): *The Rise and Fall of Nigeria: The History and Philosophy of an Experiment in African Nation Building*, Malthouse Press Ltd.: Ikeja, Lagos
- Balewa, B. A. T. (1994): *Governing Nigeria: History, Problems, and Prospects*. Malthouse Ltd.: Ikeja, Lagos.
- Baradat, L. P. (1978): *Political Ideologies*. Prentice Hall Inc.: Englewood Cliff, N.J
- Batabyal, A. A. and H. Beladi (2008): "Bribery and Favouritism in Queuing Models of Rationed Resource Allocation." *Journal of Theoretical Politics*, Vol. 20, No. 3, Pp. 329-338
- Bawa, M. A. and T. Garba (2004): "Critical Review of the Corrupt Practice and Other Related Offences Act, 2000". *Management Network Journal*, Vol. 3, No. 5, June, Pp. 73-83.
- Beare, M. E. (2007): "The Devil Made Me Do It: Business Partners in Crime." *Journal of Financial Crime*, Vol. 14, No.1, Pp. 34-48
- Bhattacharyya, S. C. (2007): "Energy Sector Management Issues: An Overview." *International Journal of Energy Sector and Management*, Vol. 1 No. 1, Pp. 13-33
- Boehm, F. (2007): "Anti-Corruption Strategies as Safeguard for Public Sector Reforms". Working Paper, Research Centre in Political Economy, Universidad Extenado de Columbia
- Brock, W. A. and St. P. Magee (1984): "The Invisible Foot and the Waste of Nations." In: D. C. Colander (Ed.), *Neoclassical Political Economy: The Analysis of Rent Seeking and DUP Activities*. Ballinger Publishing Company: Cambridge, Pp. 177-186.
- Bugaje, U. M. (2005): "The Nigerian Question: The Way Forward." In: A. K. W. Aniche (Ed.), *Discharging a Burden—Voices from the 1<sup>st</sup> Trust Annual Dialogue—The Nigerian Question: The Way Forward*, Media Trust Ltd.: Lagos, Pp. 80-90
- Cantwell, G. L. (2007): "Nation-Building: A Joint Enterprise." *Parameters*, Autumn, 2007, Pp. 54-68
- Chambers, C. (2003): "Nation-Building, Neutrality and Ethnocultural Justice: Kymlicka's Liberal Pluralism". *Ethnicities*, Vol. 3, No. 3, Pp. 295-319.
- Chetwynd, E., F. Chetwynd and B. Spector (2003): "Corruption and Poverty: A Review of Recent Literature." Final Report: Management Systems International, Washington DC, January.
- Chinhamo, O. and G. Shumba (2007): "Institutional Definition of Corruption." Working Paper -1-ACT-South Africa Working Paper Series, ACT/1/2007/WPS

- Connelly, B. S. and D. S. Ones (2008): "The Personality of Corruption: A National Level Analysis." *Cross-Cultural Research*, Vol. 42, No. 4, Pp. 353-385.
- Dandago, K. I. (2008): "The Constitutional Fight Against Corruption in Nigeria: Is It Enough?" *International Journal on Governmental Financial Management*, Vol. 8, Pp. 61-70
- Darken, K. (2008): "The Integrity of Corrupt States: Graft as an Internal State Institution". *Politics and Society*, Vol. 36, No. 1, March, Pp 35-60
- Desta, Y. (2006): "Designing Anti-Corruption Strategies for Developing Countries: A Country Study of Eritrea." *Journal of Developing Societies*, Vol. 22, No. 4, Pp. 421-449
- DiMaggio, P. J. and W. W. Powell (1983): "The Iron cage Revisited: Institutional Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in Organisational Fields." *American Sociological Review*, Vol. 48, No. 2, Pp. 147-160
- Dobbins, J. (2003): "Nation-Building: The Inescapable Responsibility of the World's Only Superpower." *RAND Review*, Summer, 2009
- Dozie, P. and O. Bickersteth (1993): *Report on the First Nigeria Economic Summit*. Spectrum Books Ltd: Ibadan
- Ejiogu, E. C. (2001): "The Roots of Political Instability in an Artificial 'Nation State': The Case of Nigeria." *International Journal of Comparative Sociology*, Vol. 42, No. 3, Pp. 323-340
- Ekeanyanwu, L., S. Loremikan and J. Ikubaje (2004): *The National Integrity Systems TI Country Study Report: Nigeria 2004*. Transparency International: Berlin, Germany
- Elaigwu, J. I. (2005): "The National Question: The Way Forward." In: A. K. W. Aniche (Ed.), *Discharging a Burden—Voices from the 1<sup>st</sup> Trust Annual Dialogue—The Nigerian Question: The Way Forward*, Media Trust Ltd.: Lagos, Pp. 34-49
- Eweje, G. (2006): "The Role of MNEs in Community Development Initiatives in Developing Countries: Corporate Social Responsibility at Work in Nigeria and South Africa." *Business & Society*, Vol. 45, No. 2, June, Pp. 93-129
- Ewhrudjakpor, C. (2008): "Poverty and Its Alleviation: The Nigerian Experience." *International Social Work*, Vol. 51, No. 4, Pp. 519-531
- Fayol, H. (1949): *General and Industrial Administration*. (trans. by C. Storrs), Pitman: London.
- Federal Government of Nigeria [FGN] (2000): *Obasanjo's Economic Direction, 1999-2003*. Dawn Functions Nigeria Limited; Ikeja, Lagos
- Ferrell, O. C. and J. Fraedrich (1997): *Business Ethics: Ethical Decision Making and Cases*. Houghton Mifflin Company: NY

- Goldsmith, A. A. (1999): "Slapping the Grasping Hand: Correlates of Corruption in Global Markets." *American Journal of Economics and Sociology*, Vol. 58, No. 4, Pp. 866-83.
- Gurin, A. M (n.d): *The Concept of Honesty in Islam: It's Role in Fostering Discipline in Nigeria*. NOA Occasional Publication, No 1A
- Hess, D. (2009): "Corruption in the Value Chain: Private to Private and Private to Public Corruption". In: TI, *Global Corruption Report 2009: Corruption and the Private Sector*. Cambridge University Press: New York, Pp. 19-23
- Hoff, D. (2006): "South African Cellular Wars in Nigeria," *International Journal of Emerging Markets*, Vol. 1, No.1, Pp. 84-95
- Hofstede, G., B. Neuijen, D. Ohayv and G. Sanders (1990): "Measuring Organisational Cultures: A Qualitative and Quantitative Study Across 20 Cases." *Administrative Science Quarterly*, Vol. 35, No. 2. Pp. 286-316.
- Ikejiani-Clark, M. (2005): "The Nigerian Question: The Way Forward." In: A. K. W. Aniche (Ed.), *Discharging a Burden—Voices from the 1<sup>st</sup> Trust Annual Dialogue—The Nigerian Question: The Way Forward*, Media Trust Ltd.: Lagos, Pp. 91-108
- Inegbedion, N. A. (2004): "Corruption and Anti-Corruption Legislations in Nigeria: A Critique." *University of Benin Law Journal*, Vol. 7, No.1 Pp. 139-142
- Iyanda, O. (2001): "The Human Factor in Policy and Plan Implementation." *Management in Nigeria*, Vol. 37, Nos. 3&4
- Johnston, M. (1996): "The Search for Definitions: The Vitality of Politics and the Issue of Corruption." *International Social Science Journal*, No. 149, Pp. 387-392.
- Kaur, S. (2007): "Institutional Development as a Challenge to Democratic Sustenance in Nigeria". *International Studies*, Vol. 44, No. 3, Pp. 217-233
- Khalil, F. and J. Lawaree (1995): "Collusive Auditors". *American Economic Review*, Vol. 85, No. 2, Pp. 442-446.
- King, L. D. (2001): "State and Ethnicity in Pre-colonial Northern Nigeria." *Journal of Asian and African Studies*, Vol. 36, No. 4, Pp. 339-360
- Kingshott, R. P. T. and O. C. Dincer (2008): "Determinants of Public Service Employee Corruption: A Conceptual Model from the Psychological Contract Perspective." *Journal of Industrial Relations*, Vol. 50, No.1, Pp 69-85
- Klitgaard, R. (1988): *Controlling Corruption*. University of California Press, Berkeley
- Klitgaard, R. (1997): "Cleaning Up and Invigorating the Civil Service". *Public Administration and Development*, Vol. 17, Pp. 4887-509.
- Kumar, A. (2005): "Problems of Democratic Transition and

- Consolidation in Nigeria: Drawing Lessons from the Democratic Experience in India." *Journal of Asian African Studies*, Vol. 40, No. 5, Pp. 371-392.
- Laffont, J. T. and J. Tirole (1991): "The Politics of Government Decision Making: A Theory of Regulatory Capture." *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, Vol. 106, No. 4, Pp. 1088-1127.
- Lambsdorff, J. G. (2001): "How Corruption in Government Affects Public Welfare: A Review of Theories". Discussion Paper 9, Centre for Globalization and Europeanization of the Economy, January.
- le Billon, P. (2003): "Buying Peace or Fuelling War: The Role of Corruption in Armed Conflicts." *Journal of International Development*, Vol. 15, Pp. 413-426.
- Leite, C. and J. Weidmann (1999): "Does Mother Nature Corrupt? Natural Resources, Corruption, and Economic Growth," International Monetary Fund Working Paper, 99/85, July
- Lennerfors, T. T. (2009): "The Vicissitude of Corruption: Degeneration, Transgression, Jouissance." *Business and Society*, Vol. 48, No. 3 September, Pp. 406-419
- Manzetti, L and C. J. Wilson (2007): "Why Do Corrupt Governments Maintain Public Support?" *Comparative Political Studies*, Vol. 40, No. 8, Pp. 949-970
- Mbaku, J. M (2007): *Corruption in Africa: Causes, Consequences and Cleanups*. Lexington Books, Lanham, MD
- Mele, M. L. and B. M. Bello (2007): "Coaxing and Coercion in Roadblock Encounters on Nigerian Highways." *Discourse and Society*, Vol. 18, No. 4, Pp. 437-452
- Microsoft® Encarta®2009 ©1993-2008. Microsoft Corporation. All right reserved
- Mishler, N. and R. Rose (2009): "Seeing Is Not Believing: Measuring Corruption Perception and Experiences." Paper prepared for Midwest Political Science Association Annual Meeting, April 2-5, Chicago.
- Momodu, R. (2002): "Book Review: The Political Economy of Poverty, Equity and Growth—Nigeria and Indonesia." *Progress in Development Studies*, Vol. 2, Pp. 64-66
- Murithi, T. (2006): "African Approaches to Building Peace and Social Solidarity." *African Journal on Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 6, No. 2, Pp. 9-34
- Nanda, V. P. (2006): "The 'Good Governance' Concept Revisited." *The Annals of Academy of Political and Social Science*, Vol. 603, Pp. 269-283
- Napal, G. (2005): "An Assessment of Power Abuse under Ethics Philosophies." *Electronic Journal of Business Ethics and Organisation Studies*, Vol. 10, No. 1, Pp. 29-34
- Napal, G. (2006): "An Assessment of the Ethical Dimension of Corruption."

- Electronic Journal of Business Ethics and Organisation Studies*, Vol. 11, No. 1, Pp. 5-9.
- Nellist, R., N. Godfrey and J. Preston (2008): *Competition Assessment Framework: An Operational Guide for Identifying Barriers to Competition in Developing Countries*. DFID: London
- Nolte, I. (2007): "Ethnic Vigilantes and the State: The Oodua People's Congress in South-Western Nigeria." *International Relations*, Vol. 21, NO. 2, Pp. 217-235
- Nye, J. S. (1967): "Corruption and Political Development." *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 61, No. 2, Pp. 417-427.
- Obama, B. (2006): *The Audacity of Hope: Thoughts on Reclaiming the American Dream*. Three Rivers Press: New York
- Ojo, E. O. (2003): "The Mass Media and the Challenges of Sustainable Democratic Values in Nigeria: Possibilities and Limitations." *Media, Culture & Society*, Vol. 25, Pp. 821–840
- Ojo, E. O. (2006): "Taming the Monster: Demilitarization and Democratization in Nigeria." *Armed Forces and Society*, Vol. 32, No. 2, January, Pp. 254-272
- Okogbule, N. S. (2007): "Official Corruption and the Dynamics of Money Laundering in Nigeria." *Journal of Financial Crime*, Vol. 14, No. 1, Pp. 49-63
- Olowu, B. (2001): "Pride and Performance in African Public Services: Analysis of Institutional Breakdown and Rebuilding Efforts in Nigeria and Uganda." *International Review of Administrative Sciences*, Vol. 67, Pp. 117-134
- Pattel, L. and T. Wilson (2004): "Civil Service in Sub-Saharan Africa." *Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly*, Vol. 33, No. 4, December, Pp. 225-385
- Pogge, T. W. (2002): "Moral Universalism and Global Economic Justice." *Politics, Philosophy & Economics*, Vol. 1, No. 1, Pp. 29-58
- Ribadu, N. (2009): "Corruption Has Destroyed the Fabric of Nigeria". Nuhu Rabidu's Testimony before the US House Financial Services Committee, May 19, 2009, and Published in: *Desert Herald*, Vol. 3, No. 16, 26th May–2nd June.
- Rossouw, G. J. (1998): "Establishing Moral Business Culture in Newly Formed Democracies." *Journal of Business Ethics*, Vol. 17, No. 14, Pp. 1563-1571
- Salisu, B. (2002): "Behavioural Reengineering: An Alternative to the Nigerian Poverty Alleviation Programmes." *Management Network Journal*, Vol. 1, No. 1, July, Pp. 48-56.
- Salisu, B. (2003): "National Citizenship: A More Perfect Basis for National Cohesion." *Management Network Journal*, Vol. 1, No. 2, December, Pp. 39-46

- Salisu, B. (2009): "The Role of the Civil Service in Policy Formulation and Implementation." *Management Network Journal*, Vol. 6, Nos. 12&13, June-December, Pp. 1-19
- Sanusi, S. L. (2005): "Reforming the Nigerian Economy: A Theoretical Critique of Nigeria's Economic Policy". In: K. W. Aniche (Ed.), *Discharging a Burden: Voices from the 2nd Trust Annual Dialogue—Reforming Nigeria: Which Model?* Media Trust Ltd.: Nigeria. Pp. 74-102.
- Scott, R. (1995): *Institutions and Organisations*. Sage Publications: Thousand Oaks, CA
- Sesay, A., C. Ukeje, O. Aina and A. Odebiyi (2003): *Ethnic Militias and the Future of Democracy in Nigeria*. Obafemi Awolowo University Press: Ile-Ife, Nigeria
- Seubert, R. (2005): "On the Nature of the Corrupt Firm: Where to Situate Liability?" Discussion Paper, No. Vr-33-05, University of Passau, Passau, Germany, March 17
- Shen, C. and J. B. Williamson (2005): "Corruption, Democracy, Economic Freedom and State Strength: A Cross National Analysis". *International Journal of Comparative Sociology*, Vol. 46, No. 4, Pp. 327-345
- Shleifer, A. and R. W. Vishny (1996): *The Grabbing Hand: Government Pathologies and Their Cures*. Harvard University Press: Cambridge, MA.
- Sliter, J. (2007): "The Price of Corporate Crime: The Risk to Business." *Journal of Financial Crime*, Vol. 14, No.1, Pp. 12-16
- Smith, I. and T. Boyns (2005): "British Management Theory and Practice: The Impact of Fayol." *Management Decision*, Vol. 43, No. 10, Pp. 1317-1334
- Sowunmi, F. A., M. A. Adesola and M. A. Salako (2009): "An Appraisal of the Performance of the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission in Nigeria." *International Journal of Offender Therapy and Comparative Criminology*, Published on August 13 as: d01:10.1177/036624x09341043, hosted at <http://online.sagepub.com>
- Spalding, N. (2000): "A Cultural Explanation of Collapse into Civil War: Escalation of Tension in Nigeria." *Culture and Psychology*, Vol. 6, No. 1, Pp. 51-87.
- Tavits, M. (2008): "Representation, Corruption and Subjective Well-being." *Comparative Political Studies*, Vol. 41, No. 12, December, Pp.1607-1630
- Tijjani, K. (1989): "The Ruling Elite". In: Y. B. Usman (Ed.), *Nigeria Since Independence: The First 25 Years*. Heinemann Educational Books (Nig) Ltd.: Ibadan.
- Tolofari, S. (2004): *Explanation and Instability in Nigeria: The Orkar Corp in Perspective*. Press Alliance Network Ltd, Lagos.

- Transparency International [TI] (2008): *TI Bribe Payers Index 2008*, TI, Berlin, Germany
- Transparency International [TI] (2009a): *Global Corruption Report 2009: Corruption and the Private Sector*, University Press, New York.
- Transparency International [TI] (2009b): "Corruption in the Education Sector." Working Paper No. 4 2009, Transparency International
- Treisman, D. (2000): "The Causes of Corruption: A Cross-National Study," *Journal of Public Economics*, Vol. 76, Pp. 399-457
- Tukur, M. (2005): "The Nigerian Question: The Way Forward." In: A. K. W. Aniche (Ed.), *Discharging a Burden—Voices from the 1<sup>st</sup> Trust Annual Dialogue—The Nigerian Question: The Way Forward*, Media Trust Ltd.: Lagos, Pp. 62-79
- Tynes, R. (2007): "Nation-Building and the Diaspora on Leononet: A Case of Sierra Leone in Cyberspace." *New Media and Society*, Vol. 9, No. 3, Pp. 497-518
- Uniamikogbo, S. O. (2006): "Management Imperatives for Economic Reforms." Paper presented at Nigerian Institute of Management (Chartered) Conference, on "Managing Our Future Today," at Inter-national Conference Centre, Abuja, November 20 and 21
- Venard, B. (2009): "Corruption in Emerging Countries; A Matter of Isomorphism." *M@n@gement*, Vol. 12, No. 1, Pp. 1-27.
- Venard, B. and M. Hanafi (2008): "Organisational Isomorphism and Corruption in Financial Institutions: Empirical Research in Emerging Countries." *Journal of Business Ethics*, Vol. 81, Pp. 481-498.
- Walby, S. (2003): "The Myth of the Nation-State: Theorizing Society and Politics in a Global Era." *Sociology*, Vol. 37, No. 3, Pp. 529-546
- Walcoff, C.; R. P. Ouellette and P. N. Cheremisinoff (1983): *Techniques for Managing Technological Innovation: Overcoming Process Barriers*. Butterworth Publishers: Boston

Werlin, H. H. (2000): "The Concept of Secondary Corruption." *International Review of Administrative Sciences*, Vol. 66, Pp. 181-185

Xin, X. and T. K. Rudel (2004): "The Content for Political Corruption: A Cross-National Analysis." *Social Science Quarterly*, Vol. 85, Pp. 294-309.